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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:54 pm
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Results for border security (u.s.)
21 results foundAuthor: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed Summary: Within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Custom and Border Protection's (CBP) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure -- fencing, roads, and lighting. The GAO was asked to provide periodic updates on the status of the program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which CBP has implemented SBInet and the impact of delays that have occurred, and (2) the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its results. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2009. 42p. Source: Report to Congressional Requesters; GAO-09-896 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 115347 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.) |
Author: Bilbray, Brian Title: Broken Neighbor, Broken Border: A Field Investigation Report of the House Immigration Reform Caucus Summary: Since passage into law of the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 and the Secure Fence Act of 2006, illegal entries on the U.S. southern border are down by half. The degree to which these reforms have contributed to this success balanced against the decreased activity of economic illegal aliens due to recession is subject to honest debate. However there is no doubt by any law enforcement agency on the southern border that both reform bills have worked to increase security and reduce illegal entries into the United States, especially at ports of entry. However, the nature of illegal entries has become increasingly dangerous to the homeland security of our nation, based on the near collapse of civil authority in the northern states of Mexico. The Rule of Law in Mexico has degenerated to a point of near anarchy along our shared border. Violent and heavily armed Mexican drug cartel members, human traffickers, and Middle East terrorists are crossing at will, with Al-Qaeda affiliated Somalis the target of Department of Homeland Security alerts in the Houston area. A long-term deployment of a minimum 25,000 armed troops with enforcement power is necessary on our southern border to preserve U.S. sovereignty and the lives of American citizens from organized armed forces hostile to the United States. The southern border of the United States is still being successfully infiltrated by a half million illegal aliens annually, according to Department of Homeland Security statistics. While down from a high mark of over a million in 2006 due to increased manpower and resources of the U.S. Border Patrol and the recession, the nature of illegal crossings has grown far more sinister and threatening. The illegal entrants consist of not just “economic” violators, but also heavily armed drug cartel members and “OTMs” - other than Mexican illegal aliens - from diverse countries including Middle Eastern nations with terrorist factions currently at war with U.S. forces. Mexican drug cartel members now operating inside the United States as a result of these breaches are directly linked to over 28,000 violent murders and executions on the other side of the Rio Grande. According to virtually all law enforcement on the border, Texas and the other border states are in imminent danger of this level of violence exploding across the border into the United States. Kidnappings and murders by the cartels inside the U.S. are already occurring. Both U.S. Border Patrol officers and Texas law enforcement agencies are at present forced to back down from these heavily armed incursions, due to the overwhelming firepower and manpower of the drug cartels. U.S. private property owners on the border have been largely abandoned to defend themselves, and have begun to be murdered. The U.S. Border Patrol is operating under conditions set by the Administration that guarantee hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens will succeed in their effort to infiltrate the United States. The official position of the Administration, which has been forced on the U.S. Border Patrol, is that even after admitting to these conditions, the border is more secure than it has ever been, that U.S. national security needs are being met as well as they can be, and that efforts by the states and local law enforcement to combat this explosive situation beyond the efforts of the Administration should be legally stymied. Texas Sheriffs are now experiencing the first spillovers of the mass murders and executions that have effectively destroyed social order across the border. To place in perspective the degree of anarchy and violence, Mexico has experienced 28,000 murders since the drug wars began in 2006; by comparison, the United States has lost around 6,000 soldiers in both Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. The U.S. justified going to war against Serbia in 1998 based on an estimated and highly debatable 10,000 civilian casualties in that civil war. Like that conflict, mass graves continue to be found in Mexico, including the most recent discovery of 72 murdered Central and South American immigrants just south of the Texas border. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, House Immigration Reform Caucus, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2011 at: http://www.protectyourtexasborder.com/Portals/6/Documents/Broken%20Neighbor%20Broken%20Border.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.protectyourtexasborder.com/Portals/6/Documents/Broken%20Neighbor%20Broken%20Border.pdf Shelf Number: 122487 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)HomicidesIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationViolence |
Author: Hall, Christopher Title: Securing the Borders: Creation of the Border Patrol Auxiliary Summary: Although the U.S. Border Patrol is the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency in the country, its resources appear to be far short of what is required to truly accomplish its mandate. Most of the Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) 30,000 officers operate in the nation's 314 land, air, and seaports of entry, where they admit an average 1.2 million legal visitors a day. A majority of the border remains void of barriers, surveillance, and the presence of Border Patrol agents. The government demonstrated its commitment to improved border security in 2006 with an 11% increase in the CBP's budget, now over $7 billion. But the new money is dedicated to several initiatives and only pays for an additional 1,500 border patrol agents. Public demand for action to meet border patrol requirements compelled the President to order the deployment of 6,000 National Guardsmen to the Mexican border as part of "Operation Jump Start." While fences and new technologies such as ground sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles will enhance the "reach" of existing agents, nothing would close the gap better than creating a program to increase the number of agents along the border. Citizen auxiliaries have ample precedence in assisting law enforcement agencies. The Coast Guard Auxiliary, Civil Air Patrol, and many other police auxiliaries have long and successful histories. Several volunteer groups have sprung up in recent years to help patrol the border. The Border Patrol has publicly welcomed their efforts as observers but operationally kept them at arms length. This paper evaluates the feasibility of establishing a civilian auxiliary within the Border Patrol. By examining the missions, authorities, costs, legal foundations, and organizational cultures of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary, The authors can identify elements key to developing a successful auxiliary program. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Security Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2007. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 4, 2011 at: http://dodreports.com/ada476945 Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://dodreports.com/ada476945 Shelf Number: 122973 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.) |
Author: New York University School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic Title: Justice Derailed: What Raids on New York’s Trains and Buses Reveal about Border Patrol’s Interior Enforcement Practices Summary: This report is the first-ever in-depth examination of the Border Patrol’s transportation raids in upstate New York. It paints a disturbing picture of an agency resorting to aggressive policing tactics in order to increase arrest rates, without regard for the costs and consequences of its practices on New Yorkers’ rights and freedoms. The report extends beyond transportation raids to other Border Patrol practices as well, raising serious concerns about an agency that appears to be driven by the belief that the regular rules of the Constitution do not apply to it. American democracy was founded on the idea that people possess certain inalienable rights, among them the right to privacy and the right to move freely about the country. Throughout this nation’s history, Americans have never been required to carry identification papers proving their citizenship. “Show me your papers” is a statement posed to people living under oppressive regimes, not those residing in the world’s oldest democracy. Anyone who has traveled on trains and buses through upstate New York in recent years has cause to question the federal government’s fealty to these core democratic values. Throughout central and western New York, armed Border Patrol agents routinely board trains and buses nowhere near the border to question passengers about their citizenship. They force certain people to produce documents proving their citizenship or immigration status. Passengers who cannot produce documentation to an agent’s satisfaction are subjected to arrest, detention and potential deportation. These “transportation raids” occur many miles from the Canadian border or any point of entry into the United States. They do little to protect the border, but they threaten constitutional protections that apply to citizens and immigrants alike, invite racial profiling, tear apart families and burden taxpayers with the cost of detaining individuals who were arrested while innocently going about their business. The transportation raids also serve as a window into the practices of an agency that, although charged with policing the border, abuses its authority through its unprecedented reach into the interior of the United States and the use of aggressive search and seizure procedures that do not comport with standards and expectations for domestic policing or interior immigration enforcement. While the full extent of the Border Patrol’s interior enforcement practices remains unknown, community groups have documented abuses of power that extend beyond the transportation system and into our state’s towns and villages. These concerns include complaints of Border Patrol agents wrongfully stopping, questioning and arresting individuals, including United States citizens, and engaging in improper enforcement practices in close collaboration with state and local police. This report is the first in-depth examination of transportation raids by Border Patrol agents in upstate New York, particularly in the Rochester Station within the Border Patrol’s Buffalo sector. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, which is still being litigated, the authors of this report obtained a complete dataset of all transportation arrests in Rochester Station from 2006 to 2009 and detailed information on a random sample of 200 of those arrests. Analysis of the documents obtained through the FOIA litigation and other publicly available documents confirm that Rochester Station’s interior transportation raids represent a shift from the Border Patrol’s mission of policing the border. Furthermore, the evidence suggests an established pattern of misconduct by Border Patrol agents in the course of transportation raids. Key preliminary findings from this data include the following: Despite the Border Patrol’s mission of policing the border, transportation raids do not target recent border-crossers. From 2006 to 2009, less than 1 percent of transportation raid arrests were made at entry, and only 1 percent were made within 72 hours of entry. In contrast, 76 percent of those arrested on transportation raids in Rochester had been in the United States for more than a year, and 12 percent of these individuals had been present for more than 10 years. Interior transportation raid arrests represent the majority of the Rochester Station’s arrests despite the fact that they occur far from any point-of-entry into the United States. Although the agency long sought to block release1 of precise yearly data, we now know that transportation arrests constituted almost two-thirds of all arrests in Rochester between 2007 and 2009. Agents widely violate established arrest procedures in the course of transportation raids. In 77 percent of all transportation raid arrests between 2006 and 2009, Rochester Station officers violated the two-officer rule, which requires that someone other than the arresting officer, whose judgment may be clouded by numerous factors, examine the person who was arrested and determine whether to commence removal proceedings or exercise prosecutorial discretion. In addition to violating the agency’s own regulations, such violations implicate significant due process rights and Fourth Amendment requirements. Despite the immense human and financial costs of overzealous detention, data culled from the sample of Rochester transportation raid arrests reveal that more than 73 percent of individuals arrested were then placed in a detention facility rather than released while awaiting the adjudication of their case. The data further indicates that were it not for a lack of bed space, agents would have detained an even higher percentage of transportation raid arrestees. Details: New York: New York Civil Liberties Union, 2011. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2011 at: http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_justicederailedweb.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_justicederailedweb.pdf Shelf Number: 123301 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrationTransportation |
Author: Barry, Tom Title: Fallacies of High-Tech Fixes for Border Security Summary: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The new department promised border security over traditional border-control operations. Rushing to secure the borders, the abundantly funded DHS nearly tripled the number of Border Patrol agents, fortified ports-of-entry, built a highly controversial border wall and quickly opted for several high-tech initiatives to patrol the border with virtual eyes. DHS rushed ahead with its two remote surveillance initiatives—the SBInet program (commonly known as the “virtual fence”) and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program—without having a detailed or focused border security strategy in place. Not only did this expedited border security lack a strategy, but it also lacked a foundation of successful experience in high-tech border control. Instead, it has been based more on dreams, hopes and fantasy—and on the widely shared, but faulty, assumption that technology provided by private contractors could meet the challenge of securing the country’s nearly 6,000 miles of land borders with remote surveillance systems. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the DHS agency in charge of border security, states it is committed to “a comprehensive and systemic upgrading of the technology used in controlling the border.” But the new agency lacks the oversight and management capacity, in-house technological expertise, and the necessary commitment to direct and operate its proposed high-tech solutions. CBP professes its commitment to protecting the homeland against the entry of “dangerous people and goods.” Yet it lacks a strategy that prioritizes actual threats. Its high-tech initiatives, like the entire Secure Border Initiative (SBI) endeavor, which encompasses the two main high-tech border security programs, are shockingly unfocused and nonstrategic. Even when the immensely expensive technological surveillance occasionally does work, CBP’s high-tech web catches only illegal border crossers looking for work or carrying backpacks of marijuana. These arrests and drug seizures are certainly not the reason the Department of Homeland Security was created and cannot justify the continuing depletion of the U.S. treasury in the unfocused post-September 11 quest for border security. Trying to stand by its promise to gain “operational control” over the land borders, DHS hurriedly turned to high-tech fixes for border security. But DHS’s hasty commitment to remote surveillance technology—such as virtual fences and drones—has been symptomatic of the new department’s apparent confidence that there would be unlimited funding for border security and that its operations would not be subject either to cost-benefit analysis or to evaluations of the impact on homeland security. Rather than being guided by threat assessments, they have been experiments in technological wish fulfillment. This International Policy Report examines the failed SBInet and UAV programs. Sidebars in the report examine the support of high-tech fixes for border security by liberal sectors and the role of congressional supporters of UAVs. A final section includes conclusions and recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2010. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: International Policy Report: Accessed November 29, 2011 at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/1004_TBP.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/1004_TBP.pdf Shelf Number: 123487 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Homeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsIllegal Immigration |
Author: Bakir, Niyazi Onur Title: An Analysis of Truck Cargo Security at Southwestern Borders and Potential Impacts of Cross-Border Trucking Services of Mexican Carriers on Terrorism Risk Exposure Summary: This report aims to assess the feasibility of Mexican truck border crossings beyond the current commercial zone os 20 miles, while maximizing the federal government's ability to deter and intercept smuggling of weaspons and nuclear materials. This assessment includes a review of inspection processes on either side of the border and security challenges faced by Mexican factories, truck-drivers and customs brokers. Details: Los Angeles: Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California, 2006. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Report #06-003): Accessed January 23, 2012 at: http://create.usc.edu/research/54710.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://create.usc.edu/research/54710.pdf Shelf Number: 123739 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Cargo SecurityRisk Assessment, TerrorismSmuggling |
Author: Garza, V. Title: Vulnerabilities of the National Border Security Strategy on the U.S. Border Patrol Summary: This report analyzes critical issues within the United States Border Patrol that have led to high attrition rates within the agency and an all-time low in morale among Border Patrol agents. A broadcast of Lou Dobbs Tonight reported, "Customs and border protection agents' hands are tied because their job no longer includes enforcement. Instead they have to man their posts 8-10 hours a day to serve as a deterrent, part of a bureaucratic decision that critics say is jeopardizing our national security.”1 The United States Border Patrol, a critical agency within the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, is responsible for defending our borders between ports of entry. But when they are told to stand down and not do their job, who will? In June 2004, the Border Patrol station in Temecula, California, formed a special Mobile Patrol Group that conducted a series of illegal alien sweeps in the communities of Norco, Corona, Escondido. The 12-man group made more than 450 arrests resulting in both approval and contempt. Latino activists were enraged, accusing the Border Patrol of violating their civil rights. Asa Hutchinson, then Undersecretary of Homeland Security, announced that while the sweeps were not illegal, they did breach policy and the chain of command. Robert Bonner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner, issued that same month an order that all future enforcement operations within the surrounding areas of checkpoints must first be approved by Border Patrol Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Morale at the Temecula border patrol station sank to its lowest level. “We don't know which way to turn – for once, we were doing our job, what the government pays us to do," said Ron Zermeno, shop steward for the National Border Patrol Council at the Temecula station.2 The purpose of this report is to raise significant problems within the National Border Patrol Strategy and how these problems affect the mission of the U.S. Border Patrol. This report is divided into three main parts. The first looks at the different risks and vulnerabilities that have shaped Border Patrol strategies at the northern and southwest borders. The second part focuses on Border Patrol operations: the history of Border Patrol, priorities pre and post 9/11, budget obligations and resources, and cooperation with land management agencies on federal borderlands. The last section analyzes the effects of problems internal to Border Patrol agents on national security. Areas focused on include inadequate staffing, insufficient technology, and attrition rates. A solution for a long-term Border Patrol strategy is beyond the scope of this report. Follow-up work should include possible assessments to determine the optimal number of personnel needed to secure the border. An evaluation of the proper technology necessary to deploy to the northern and southern border is also critical. It is essential that the Department of Homeland Security develop a long-term National Border Security Strategy based on a risk and vulnerability assessment. Details: Los Angeles, CA: CREATE - Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, 2005. 36p. Source: Report #05-022: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2012 at http://create.usc.edu/research/50792.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://create.usc.edu/research/50792.pdf Shelf Number: 124023 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Risk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: Predd, Joel B. Title: Using Pattern Analysis and Systematic Randomness to Allocate U.S. Border Security Resources Summary: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting U.S. borders against terrorist threats, criminal endeavors, illegal immigration, and contraband. Unfortunately, due to budgetary and other resource constraints, it cannot "see and be" everywhere at once. In response, the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) is investigating how pattern and trend analysis and systematic randomness can be used to position border security personnel and equipment in the places and at the times they will be most effective. A RAND study examined how these techniques affect interdiction rates, incorporating results from a RAND-developed agent-based simulation model of the interaction of border patrol agents and illegal smugglers. The model allowed an exploration of how interdiction rates differ across thousands of scenarios that vary by the number of patrols, the rate of illegal flow, the size of the border, and the approach OBP takes to using pattern and trend analysis and systematic randomness. The analysis shows how approaches that combine these two techniques yield higher interdiction rates than approaches using either technique alone, and it identifies circumstances in which combined approaches are competitive with perfect surveillance. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 62p. Source: Technical Report: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1211.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1211.pdf Shelf Number: 125198 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Crime Patterns |
Author: Gambler, Rebecca Title: Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and Assessment Efforts Summary: Border Patrol, within DHS’s CBP, is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the national borders between the U.S. ports of entry (POE). DHS has completed a new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) that Border Patrol officials stated will emphasize risk management instead of increased resources to achieve border security and continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). This statement highlights key issues from prior GAO reports that discuss Border Patrol’s progress and challenges in (1) implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy and (2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the border. This statement is based on GAO reports issued since 2007 on border security, with selected updates from April and May 2012 on Border Patrol resource needs, actions taken to address prior GAO recommendations, and efforts to develop performance measures. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed agency documents such as operational assessments and interviewed DHS officials. In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to, among other things, strengthen border security technology, infrastructure, and partnerships. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has reported actions planned or underway to address them. CBP reviewed a draft of information contained in this statement and provided comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-688T: Accessed May 16, 2012 at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Gambler.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Gambler.pdf Shelf Number: 125315 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Maritime Crime |
Author: Morral, Andrew R. Title: Measuring Illegal Border Crossing Between Ports of Entry: An Assessment of Four Promising Methods Summary: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for controlling the flow of goods and people across the U.S. border, a difficult task that raises challenging resource management questions about how best to minimize illicit flows across the border while facilitating legitimate ones. Commonly reported border control measures, such as numbers of illegal migrants apprehended or miles of border under effective control, bear only an indirect and uncertain relationship to the border control mission, making them unreliable management tools. Fundamental to the question of border control effectiveness is the proportion of illicit border crossings that are prevented through either deterrence or apprehension. Estimating these proportions requires knowing the total flow of illicit goods or border crossings, but compelling methods for producing such estimates do not yet exist. This short paper describes four innovative approaches to estimating the total flow of illicit border crossings between ports of entry. Each is sufficiently promising to warrant further attention for purposes of supporting reliable, valid, and timely measures of illicit cross-border flow. Successfully implementing each of these approaches will require methodological development and analysis to identify barriers or constraints to using the approach, the cost of data collection, and the amount of error that can be expected in the resulting estimates. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 17, 2012 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP328.html Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP328.html Shelf Number: 125322 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Illegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Goddard, Terry Title: How to Fix a Broken Border. A Three-Part Series Summary: If the United States wants effective border security, then more effective law‐enforcement measures must be taken. The first step is to identify the right target: the increasingly sophisticated smuggling organizations known as the “cartels.” By attacking the money laundering which is the life blood of the cartels, and making the bi‐national criminal investigation and prosecution of cartel bosses a priority, the border can be made significantly more secure. In the process, the violence in Mexico and the smuggling of drugs and people into the United States will be reduced. But this requires a unified focus, with state and federal law‐enforcement agencies cooperating to target organized criminal activity rather than economic migrants. As described in the How to Fix a Broken Border series of papers, written by former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard, an effective border‐enforcement strategy must do the following: Adopt a Coordinated, Multi‐dimensional, Bi‐national Approach • We must stop compartmentalizing border objectives by illegal activity. Current agency efforts are incorrectly focused on stopping particular kinds of contraband. But a successful effort cannot be about unauthorized immigrants alone (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), or drugs alone (Drug Enforcement Agency), or guns alone (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). It must address, disrupt, and destroy the total business of the cartels. • We need a comprehensive, bi‐national, border‐wide strategy that includes federal authorities and Mexican law enforcement, as well as state and local police. Target Cartel Money • A more effective border‐enforcement strategy starts with the money. Billions of dollars in illegal revenue from the sale of drugs and other contraband flows into cartel pocketbooks each year. This revenue crosses the border, from the United States into Mexico, by many means, ranging from bulk cash shipments and wire transfers to funnel bank accounts and stored value devices. • Any serious border defense must go after the cartel’s money, but that is not happening. U.S. Treasury Department officials who observe and regulate the international movement of currency remain unwilling or unable to go after money laundering across the Mexican border. • Generally speaking, the failures of the anti‐money laundering effort are not because of inadequate statutes, but a failure of enforcement. Again and again, huge amounts of funds flowing illegally out of this country could be stopped if financial institutions and government agencies focused on the problem and aggressively policed unlawful or questionable behavior. • Current federal law limits the circumstances under which prosecutors can seize the cash they believe to be part of a criminal scheme. In contrast, Arizona law makes it far easier to hold suspected funds pending further examination of their source. Expanding federal authority, with appropriate safeguards, would enhance anti‐money laundering efforts. Close Money‐Laundering Loopholes • The cross‐border movement of “stored value” devices is a particularly critical problem. These innocent‐looking plastic cards can contain thousands if not millions of dollars and are not covered by any currency disclosure requirements at the border. Under U.S. law, no traveler may take over $10,000 in cash or cash equivalents, called “monetary instruments,” into or out of the United States without declaring that money at the border. However, stored value devices are not listed as monetary instruments or otherwise subject to declaration at the border, even though they could contain many times the $10,000 disclosure threshold. This loophole, clearly identified by federal authorities over five years ago, provides smugglers with a massive opportunity to evade anti‐money laundering security at the border. • The U.S. government must enforce existing anti‐money laundering provisions, and quickly close existing loopholes, to stop (or at least slow down) the cash flowing to the cartels. Until government agencies, especially Treasury, get more serious about cutting off the illegal international flow of funds, we can never say we have a “secure” border. Go After Cartel Bosses • Current law‐enforcement efforts primarily target low‐level subcontractors for the cartels. • This country must focus on the arrest and incarceration of cartel leaders. We need to send a clear message that it will be extremely hazardous for anyone to take a fallen leader’s place. • For example, the arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of Chapo Guzman, the notorious leader of the Sinaloa cartel, would significantly boost our border‐enforcement efforts. • Ultimately, going after the cartel bosses will require federal leadership and close cooperation with the law enforcement of Mexico. The lack of bi‐national coordination, in effect, provides cartel leaders a sanctuary south of the border. Protect Ports of Entry • One of the consequences of the hysteria about border security is the buildup of the Border Patrol at the expense of customs enforcement. With the de‐emphasis on customs inspections, more contraband gets through the ports. • By appearing tough—making fortification of the border with additional Border Patrol the top priority, while deemphasizing the ports of entry—it is now easier for the criminals to come through our front door. • Most of the criminal activity has shifted to the border crossings, not the places in between. We need more resources for inspections at ports of entry. If this country wants to stop smuggling, we must take a broader and more analytical approach to what motivates the smugglers—and the means by which they illegally move drugs, money, guns, and people in such large volumes with such impunity. Going after the contraband product or smuggled people, as this country has been doing for years, is destined to be an endless chase. The cartels will just regroup and continue operations, learning from their mistakes. If we are serious about stopping the threat on the border, we have to dismantle the criminal organizations that carry the contraband and take away the tools that make them so effective. Anything less will fail. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011. 3 parts Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2012 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series Shelf Number: 125429 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Title: Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009–2014 Strategic Plan Summary: This strategic plan is one of the most important tools we will use to chart our course of action for fiscal year (FY) 2009–14. It is designed to guide the strategic planning efforts of the various offices and programs within CBP, enabling the development of effective strategies and establishment of key priorities needed to achieve our mission and improve organizational performance. In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requirements, CBP will update this plan every 3 years. Internally, however, we will review this document annually to ensure that it continues to be relevant in our ever-changing environment. This plan is the foundation of an overall framework that links agency strategic planning to the resource allocation process. The Strategic Management Framework—a process we will use to implement our plan—will keep CBP priorities aligned, linking programs and operations to performance measures, mission-critical goals, resource priorities, and strategic objectives. I endorse this flexible, comprehensive approach with complete confidence that it will enable us to better fulfill our mission and ultimately secure and protect the Nation’s borders. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2012. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/mission/strategic_plan_09_14.ctt/strategic_plan_09_14.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/mission/strategic_plan_09_14.ctt/strategic_plan_09_14.pdf Shelf Number: 125632 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Customs Service |
Author: Koslowski, Rey Title: The Evolution of Border Controls as a Mechanism to Prevent Illegal Immigration Summary: This paper, the first in a joint project of the Migration Policy Institute and European University Institute examining US and European immigration systems, analyzes how the challenges in achieving effective US border control have increased dramatically within recent decades and particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The author examines the programmatic and funding responses US policymakers have put in place — including the Secure Border Initiative, the Visa Waiver Program, US-VISIT, and registered-traveler programs — and traces their evolution and effectiveness. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2013 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/bordercontrols-koslowski.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/bordercontrols-koslowski.pdf Shelf Number: 127436 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsIllegal Immigration |
Author: Chen, Greg Title: Border Security: Moving Beyond Past Benchmarks Summary: AssociationFor years, but especially after 9/11, the calls for border security have been increasing with many lawmakers demanding that the border must be secured. The idea has gained traction, and recent comprehensive immigration bills have been loaded with border security measures that include more border agents, fencing, and high-tech surveillance, and the expanded use of detention. Proposals, such as the 2007 Senate reform bill (S.1639), went further by requiring that specific benchmarks, “triggers,” be met before legalization could take place.1 Though none of these proposals became law, a resource-heavy approach has been implemented and has resulted in a dramatic build-up of border security and a massive expenditure of resources focused on the following: 1) Achieving “operational control” of the border; 2) Increasing border personnel; 3) Increasing border infrastructure and surveillance; and 4) Increasing penalties for border crossers, including prosecution and incarceration. In FY 2012, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) alone was funded at $11.7 billion, an increase of 64% since FY 2006.2 In 2010, Congress passed a special border security bill providing an additional $600 million on top of the amount already appropriated.3 This report examines past immigration reform proposals, specifically the 2006, 2007, and 2010 Senate bills (S. 2611, S.1639, and S.3932), and evaluates the proposals in these four areas: operational control, border personnel, border infrastructure and technology, and detention. Details: Washington, DC: American Immigration Lawyers Association, 2013. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=43061 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=43061 Shelf Number: 127634 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: An Uneasy Coexistence: Security and Migration Along the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Border Summary: In September 2011, three WOLA staff members — Senior Associate Adam Isacson, Senior Fellow George Withers, and Program Assistant Joe Bateman — paid a five-day visit to El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Isacson returned to El Paso for three days in October. We found two cities that, while separated only by a narrow river, are rapidly growing further apart. Ciudad Juárez is undergoing wrenching change as dysfunctional state institutions confront powerful, hyper-violent criminal groups. El Paso has witnessed an unprecedented buildup of the U.S. government’s security and law enforcement apparatus. The results have been mixed. Violence has not spilled over into El Paso, in part because the drug traffickers do not want it to do so. The flow of migrants from Mexico into the El Paso region has nearly ground to a halt due to greatly increased U.S. security-force presence, the poor U.S. economy, and the danger that organized-crime groups pose for migrants on the Mexican side of the border. The flow of drugs, meanwhile, continues at or near the same level as always. What we saw in El Paso raised concerns about U.S. policy. Present levels of budgets and personnel may not be sustainable. Nor may they be desirable until a series of reforms are implemented. These include human rights training for law enforcement, improved intelligence coordination, reduced military involvement, stronger accountability mechanisms, increased anticorruption measures, and greater attention to ports of entry. They also include a much sharper distinction between violent threats like organized crime or terrorism, and non-violent social problems like unregulated migration. Any reforms, however, need to be guided by a coherent policy, and for the moment the U.S. government still lacks a comprehensive border security strategy. In El Paso, WOLA found that this lack of clarity amid a security buildup has hit the migrant population especially hard. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://www.wola.org/files/111219_uneasy_coexistence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.wola.org/files/111219_uneasy_coexistence.pdf Shelf Number: 127636 Keywords: Border Law EnforcementBorder Security (U.S.)Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct. There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border. CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity. CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations). However, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents. Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process. CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a strategy, but CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy. Moreover, he stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority for overseeing all integrity-related activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-59: Accessed February 21, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650505.pdf Shelf Number: 127690 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Customs OfficialsDrug SmugglingEmployee CorruptionEmployee MisconductHuman Smuggling |
Author: Seghetti, Lisa Title: Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Port of Entry Summary: About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in FY2013, including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers and crew, and 242 million incoming land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were denied admission at ports of entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at POEs on criminal warrants. (Not all persons arrested are denied admission, including because some are U.S. citizens.) Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections at America's 329 POEs. CBP's primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of entry is to confirm that travelers are eligible to enter the United States and to exclude inadmissible aliens. Yet strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to facilitate the flow of lawful travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking admission. A fundamental question for Congress and DHS is how to balance these competing concerns. In general, DHS and CBP rely on "risk management" to strike this balance. One part of the risk management strategy is to conduct screening at multiple points in the immigration process, beginning well before travelers arrive at U.S. POEs. DHS and other departments involved in the inspections process use a number of screening tools to distinguish between known, low-risk travelers and lesser-known, higher-risk travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited admissions processing, while higher-risk travelers are usually subject to more extensive secondary inspections. As part of its dual mission, and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S. immigration system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit system at POEs. Congress required DHS' predecessor to develop an entry-exit system beginning in 1996, but the implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has proven to be an elusive goal. The current system collects and stores biographic entry data (e.g., name, date of birth, travel history) from almost all non-citizens entering the United States, but only collects biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and digital photographs) from non-citizens entering at air or seaports, and from a subset of land travelers that excludes most Mexican and Canadian visitors. With respect to exit data, the current system relies on information sharing agreements with air and sea carriers and with Canada to collect biographic data from air and sea travelers and from certain non-citizens exiting through northern border land ports; but the system does not collect data from persons exiting by southern border land ports and does not collect any biometric exit data. Questions also have been raised about DHS' ability to use existing entry-exit data to identify and apprehend visa over-stayers. The inspections process and entry-exit system may raise a number of questions for Congress, including in the context of the ongoing debate about immigration reform. What is the scope of illegal migration through ports of entry, and how can Congress and DHS minimize illegal flows without unduly slowing legal travel? Congress may consider steps to enhance POE personnel and infrastructure and to expand trusted travel programs. Congress also may continue to seek the completion of the entry-exit system, a program that has been the subject of ongoing legislative activity since 1996, as summarized in the appendix to this report. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: R43356: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43356.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43356.pdf Shelf Number: 132857 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Homeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationImmigration EnforcementRisk ManagementUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Mexico's Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America Summary: Mexico's Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America, which examines migration patterns, human trafficking and smuggling, security, and U.S. and Mexican policy at Mexico's southern border. With dozens of images, maps, statistics, and testimonies, the report not only explains what Mexico's "other border" looks like, it shows very clearly that the real humanitarian emergency is not just in shelters and detention facilities in south Texas - it runs along the entire migration route to the United States. Mexico's Other Border also outlines what is at stake for policymakers under pressure to "do something" about the current surge in migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border. Contrary to what some in Washington allege, lax U.S. border security is not to blame for this surge. (In fact, the number of security personnel on the U.S.-Mexico border has doubled in the past eight years.) WOLA found that Mexican authorities and migrant shelters alike have seen a sharp rise in migration from Central America, including the influx of families and unaccompanied children that authorities are now struggling to manage in south Texas and elsewhere on the U.S.-Mexico border. The report documents a modest but accelerating buildup of U.S.-funded security forces and infrastructure on both sides of the Mexico-Guatemala border. In a series of recommendations, authors Adam Isacson, Maureen Meyer, and Gabriela Morales call for an approach that can ease the humanitarian crisis facing Central American migrants in transit, without the risks of a large deployment of undertrained, uncoordinated, and unaccountable military, police, intelligence, and migration forces Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2014. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://www.wola.org/publications/mexicos_other_border Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wola.org/publications/mexicos_other_border Shelf Number: 133260 Keywords: Border Law EnforcementBorder Security (U.S.)Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationSmuggling |
Author: Title: U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations Summary: Although CBP's Unmanned Aircraft System program contributes to border security, after 8 years, CBP cannot prove that the program is effective because it has not developed performance measures. The program has also not achieved the expected results. Specifically, the unmanned aircraft are not meeting flight hour goals, and we found little or no evidence CBP has met its program expectations. We estimate it costs $12,255 per flight hour to operate the program; CBP's calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not include all operating costs. By not recognizing all operating costs, CBP cannot accurately assess the program's cost effectiveness or make informed decisions about program expansion. In addition, Congress and the public may be unaware of all the resources committed to the program. As a result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate how much the program has improved border security. The $443 million CBP plans to spend on program expansion could be put to better use by investing in alternatives. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: OIG-15-17: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-17_Dec14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-17_Dec14.pdf Shelf Number: 134496 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Cost-Benefit AnalysisHomeland Securityi |
Author: Seghetti, Lisa Title: Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Summary: Border enforcement is a core element of the Department of Homeland Security's effort to control unauthorized migration, with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as the lead agency along most of the border. Border enforcement has been an ongoing subject of congressional interest since the 1970s, when illegal immigration to the United States first registered as a serious national problem; and border security has received additional attention in the years since the terrorist attacks of 2001. Since the 1990s, migration control at the border has been guided by a strategy of "prevention through deterrence"-the idea that the concentration of personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology along heavily trafficked regions of the border will discourage unauthorized aliens from attempting to enter the United States. Since 2005, CBP has attempted to discourage repeat illegal migrant entries and disrupt migrant smuggling networks by imposing tougher penalties against certain unauthorized aliens, a set of policies eventually described as "enforcement with consequences." Most people apprehended at the Southwest border are now subject to "high consequence" enforcement outcomes. Across a variety of indicators, the United States has substantially expanded border enforcement resources over the last three decades. Particularly since 2001, such increases include border security appropriations, personnel, fencing and infrastructure, and surveillance technology. In addition to increased resources, the USBP has implemented several strategies over the past several decades in an attempt to thwart illegal migration. Recently, the Obama Administration announced executive actions to "fix" the immigration system. These actions address numerous issues, including a revised security plan at the southern border. The Border Patrol collects data on several different border enforcement outcomes; and this report describes trends in border apprehensions, recidivism, and estimated got aways and turn backs. Yet none of these existing data are designed to measure illegal border flows or the degree to which the border is secured. Thus, the report also describes methods for estimating illegal border flows based on enforcement data and migrant surveys. Drawing on multiple data sources, the report suggests conclusions about the state of border security. Robust investments at the border were not associated with reduced illegal inflows during the 1980s and 1990s, but a range of evidence suggests a substantial drop in illegal inflows in 2007-2011, followed by a slight rise in 2012 and a more dramatic rise in 2013. Enforcement, along with the economic downturn in the United States, likely contributed to the drop in unauthorized migration, though the precise share of the decline attributable to enforcement is unknown. Enhanced border enforcement also may have contributed to a number of secondary costs and benefits. To the extent that border enforcement successfully deters illegal entries, such enforcement may reduce border-area violence and migrant deaths, protect fragile border ecosystems, and improve the quality of life in border communities. But to the extent that aliens are not deterred, the concentration of enforcement resources on the border may increase border area violence and migrant deaths, encourage unauthorized migrants to find new ways to enter illegally and to remain in the United States for longer periods of time, damage border ecosystems, harm border-area businesses and the quality of life in border communities, and strain U.S. relations with Mexico and Canada. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: R42138: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf Shelf Number: 134497 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrationMigrationSurveillance Technology |
Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: On the Front Lines: Border Security, Migration, and Humanitarian Concerns in South Texas Summary: In December 2014, WOLA paid its third visit in two years to the Rio Grande Valley, the part of the U.S.-Mexico border closest to the Gulf of Mexico, in south Texas. This region made headlines in summer 2014 as tens of thousands of unaccompanied Central American children crossed the border here. This crisis has declined somewhat, but 2015 is still on track to be the second-largest year on record for Central American child and family migration to the United States, most of it in the Rio Grande Valley. But this is just one crisis that this region is suffering. The Rio Grande Valley now records the highest number of migrants dying of dehydration and exposure as they walk through its arid ranch lands. It sits across from what is today the most violent segment of Mexico's border zone. This segment receives the largest portion of Mexican citizens deported by the United States, who face acute safety concerns upon their return. The situation on both sides of the border is extremely difficult: for migrants, for residents on the Mexican side, and for U.S. and Mexican law enforcement personnel who have to contend with it. It requires Washington and Mexico City to take bold and humane actions. This report recommends several. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2015. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/MX/WOLA%20Report_South%20Texas%20Border%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/MX/WOLA%20Report_South%20Texas%20Border%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 134763 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)DeportationIllegal MigrationImmigration PolicyMigrants |